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ABSTRACT
Image denoising techniques have been widely employed in mul-
timedia devices as an image post-processing operation that can
remove sensor noise and produce visually clean images for further
AI tasks, e.g., image classification. In this paper, we investigate a
new task, adversarial denoise attack, that stealthily embeds attacks
inside the image denoising module. Thus it can simultaneously de-
noise input images while fooling the state-of-the-art deep models.
We formulate this new task as a kernel prediction problem and
propose the adversarial-denoising kernel prediction that can produce
adversarial-noiseless kernels for effective denoising and adversarial
attacking simultaneously. Furthermore, we implement an adaptive
perceptual region localization to identify semantic-related vulnera-
bility regions with which the attack can be more effective while not
doing too much harm to the denoising. Thus, our proposed method
is termed as Pasadena (Perceptually Aware and Stealthy Adversar-
ial DENoise Attack). We validate our method on the NeurIPS’17
adversarial competition dataset and demonstrate that our method
not only realizes denoising but has advantages of high success rate
and transferability over the state-of-the-art attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although the imaging quality of various multimedia devices, e.g.,
mobile phones and digital cameras, has been significantly improved
by using more advanced sensors, image noise is still inevitable
due to complex application situations, e.g., low light conditions. As
a result, image denoising techniques are widely employed as an
image post-processing operation that can not only remove sensor
noise and produce visually clean images but also can benefit the
state-of-the-art AI-related tasks, e.g., image classification [22].
The main sources of noise in multimedia digital images arise
during the image acquisition and/ or transmission stages. For exam-
ple, when acquiring images with a CCD/CMOS camera, the sensor
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Figure 1: CNNs, e.g., Inc-v4, are robust to natural noise, e.g., Gaussian noise,
and predict an object’s category even with noisy input. State-of-the-art de-
noising methods, e.g., kernel prediction network (KPN) [25], can improve the
quality of noisy input and are usually helpful to AI tasks, e.g., image classifi-
cation. Existing adversarial attacks, e.g., TIMIFGSM [7], can mislead CNNS
while corrupting the image. Our method Pasadena can mislead the CNNs
while improving the image quality, which makes attacks more practical for
noisy inputs that are usually caused by low-quality sensors.
temperature are one of the major factors affecting image noise. Also,
during wired or wireless digital image transmission process, the
images can be further noise corrupted due to channel interference
or other atmospheric disturbance.
To restore the corrupted image by performing image denoising,
traditional methods rely heavily on fixed hand-crafted spatial filters,
such as mean filters (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, harmonic
mean, etc.), median filter, min and max filters, etc. More recently,
learning based filters for image denoising have become more and
more popular such as [2] and [25].
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In this work, we are investigating a novel vulnerability during
the image post-processing pipeline by stealthily embedding the at-
tacks inside the denoising module. The resulting image is not only a
denoised version of itself, but also can fool the state-of-the-art deep
image classification models at the same time. We formulate this new
task as a kernel prediction problem and propose the adversarial-
denoising kernel prediction that can produce adversarial-noiseless
kernels for effective denoising and adversarial attacking simulta-
neously. Furthermore, we implement an adaptive perceptual region
localization to identify the semantic-related vulnerability regions
with which the attack can be more effective while not doing too
much harm to the denoising. Thus, our proposed method is termed
as Pasadena (Perceptually Aware and Stealthy Adversarial DENoise
Attack). As illustrated in Fig. 1, (top left) what is shown here is
that CNNs, e.g., Inc-v4, are robust to natural noise, e.g., Gaussian
noise, and usually can predict an object’s category correctly even
with noisy input. (Top right) the state-of-the-art denoising methods
such as the kernel prediction network (KPN) [25] can improve the
quality of noisy input and are usually helpful to AI tasks, e.g., image
classification. (Bottom left) existing adversarial attacks, e.g., TIM-
IFGSM [7], can mislead CNNS while corrupting the image. (Bottom
right) our proposed method, Pasadena, can not only mislead CNNs
but also at the same time improve the image quality, which makes
attacks more practical for noisy inputs that are usually caused by
low-quality sensors.
We have validated our method on the NeurIPS’17 adversarial
competition dataset and demonstrate that our method not only
realizes denoising but has advantages of high success rate and
transferability over the state-of-the-art attacks. More specifically,
our method improve the image quality for over 0.1 in SSIM eval-
uation criterion with a comparable attack success rate. When the
image qualities of our results decrease to similar level with the
other attack methods, they still maintain the whitebox attack suc-
cess rate and show better blackbox attack transferability. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the very first successful attempt to
carry out simultaneous image denoising and denoise attack. Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We have identified and investigated a novel type of adver-
sarial attack: the adversarial denoise attack.
• We have devised a novel method to embed the attacks inside
the image denoising module. Therefore, it can simultane-
ously denoise the input images while making the denoised
images fool the state-of-the-art deep image classification
models.
• Wehave formulated this new task as a kernel prediction prob-
lem and proposed the adversarial-denoising kernel prediction
that can produce adversarial-noiseless kernels for effective
denoising and adversarial attacking simultaneously.
• We have implemented an adaptive perceptual region local-
ization to identify the semantic-related vulnerability regions
with which the attack can be more effective while not doing
too much harm to the denoising.
• We have validated our method on the NeurIPS’17 adversarial
competition dataset and demonstrate that our method not
only realizes denoising but has advantages of high success
rate and transferability over the state-of-the-art attacks.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Image Denoising
Image noise is inevitable during the signal acquisition and transmis-
sion, which makes image denoising become fundamental for many
signal processing or computer vision tasks, such as visual enhance-
ment, feature extraction, and face recognition [23, 33]. Many classic
methods address it as a statistic problem using analytical priors
[31, 35]. BM3D [5], as one of the most widely used algorithms, try
to estimate the true signal by collaborative filtering several similar
image fragments and enhancing their sparsity in frequency domain.
Similarly, Guo et al. [12] use the low-rank approximation (LRA)
to estimate and depress the noise in patches. Based on the same
assumption that similar noisy patches can be averaged to better
estimate the true signal, multi-image denoising techniques includ-
ing video or burst images were built, such as VBM4D [24]. It align
similar image patches and jointly filter them by robust averaging.
Nevertheless, other researchers focus on the high image quality.
They utilize the capability of CNN techniques, addressing these
tasks as optimization problem [15, 16]. But, these works still need
alignment prediction in forward model.
Kernel-prediction networks [2] denoise Monte Carlo renderings
with a learned pre-pixel kernel map. They shift alignment calcula-
tion from input images to kernel. Inspired by this work, Mildenhall
et al. [25] denoises image burst by generating kernel maps for all
burst images. In that way, blurry artifacts in common direct pixel
predict networks are constrained.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks
The success of deep learning facilitates many computer vision clas-
sic tasks. Except for denoising [4, 47], deblurring [37], demosaicking
[8], and super-resolution [41] also propose many deep based solu-
tion. With the improvements of neural network [14, 18, 39], it starts
to enter safety and security critical applications [1, 17, 29, 30, 34].
However, Szegedy et al. [40] discovers that a carefully crafted input,
named adversarial example, can mislead a well trained deep model
generating wrong prediction with high confidence.
Let X denotes a clean image, and let ϕ(·) denotes the DNNs clas-
sifier which is known by the adversary. The goal of adversarial
attacking is to generate adversarial noise E under some constraint
limiting its ℓp norm ∥E∥p , such that prediction w.r.t. the resultant
image Xˆ = X + E becomes incorrect. The choice of p is different
in attacking methods [9, 27, 36]. Specifically, Goodfellow et al. [9]
proposed a low computational cost attack method fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) based on ℓ∞ norm. Moreover, as a typical ℓ2 norm
adversarial method, DeepFool [27] computes adversarial examples
with tiny distortion through a simple and accurate way regardless
of time consumption. Besides, Su et al. [36] presented an extreme
ℓ0 norm method indicating that merely one pixel’s modification
can totally confuse the neural networks classifier. Apart from these
while-box attacks, where the model is directly accessible by the ad-
versary, another line of work focus on enhancing the transferability
of adversary. This ability enable adversarial examples crafted for
one model to fool another model. In that case, the so called black-
box attacks can disturb real-world model and draws many sever
consequences. FGSM is a powerful whitebox adversary, and so is
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its iteration version I-FGSM. But they both have poor performance
under the setting of black-box. Dong et al. [6] upgrade this attack by
integrating momentum in each iteration. It can stabilize the update
direction and thereby enhance the transferability of adversarial
examples. Moreover, Xie et al. [46] improves the transferability
by realizing an increase in respect of input diversity. Inspired by
data augmentation techniques, they resize and translate the images
under a fixed probability to overcome the over-fitting of adversary.
Real-world photos have intrinsic noise, and denoising is a com-
mon image processing step. As mentioned above, majority of adver-
sarial examples are additive noise patterns. Some researchers hence
utilize the denoising techniques to defense adversarial examples
[28]. However, in this paper, we are proposing a new task combing
denoising and adversarial attack to explore if attackers can take
advantage of the denoising module.
3 METHOD
3.1 Problem Formulation
Given a noisy imageXn, we aim to produce an adversarial-noiseless
image, i.e., Xa, that can fool a deep model while having higher
quality than Xn. We name this task as adversarial denoise attack.
We first review recent works on kernel-prediction-based image
processing [2, 25]
Xap = g(Xnp , kp ) =
∑
q∈N(p)
Xnqkpq , (1)
where p denotes the pth noisy pixel in Xn, N(p) is the set of p’s
neighbor pixels and has size of N , i.e., p has N neighbor pixels
including itself. Then, we can process the noisy pixel by linear
combining its neighbor pixels where the combination weights are
determined by a kernel, i.e., kp = {kpq |q ∈ N(p)}. Different pixels
in Xn can have different kernels and we denote the all kernels as
K = {kp }. Intuitively, the kernels determine the way to handle a
noisy image. For example, when we let the values of kp follow a
Gaussian distribution that has highest value at kpp , Eq. 1 becomes a
Gaussian denoising method. More recent works [2, 25] offline train
a convolutional neural network (CNN) to predict a kernel for each
noisy pixel and realize much better denoising results.
To realize adversarial denoise attack, we decompose K = {kp }
into two parts, i.e., adversarial kernelKa = {kap } and denoise kernel
Kn = {knp }. The first kernel aims to generate an adversarial example
that can fool deep models while the second one is to improve the
noisy image’s quality. We then reformulate Eq. 1 as
Xap = g(Xnp ,Mp , kap , knp )
=
∑
q∈N(p)
Xnq (Mpkapq + (1 −Mp )knpq ), (2)
whereM is a perceptually-aware weight map with its values rang-
ing from 0 to 1 andMp denotes the pth pixel ofM. Intuitively,Mp
indicates if the pth pixel should be denoised or attacked. For ex-
ample, ifMp = 1, Xap =
∑
q∈N(p) Xnqkapq , which means Xap is set to
fool deep models, otherwise, it is a denoised pixel.
When using Eq. 2 to produce noiseless while adversarial exam-
ples, we should consider the following problems: 1) Given a noisy
image, how to estimate the adversarial kernel, i.e., Ka, and denoise
kernel, i.e., Kn, effectively? 2) How to estimate the perceptually
aware weight map, i.e., M, which should be sparse (i.e., to make
sure most of image regions be denoised) and perceptual (i.e., to
make sure semantic-dependent regions be attacked). We will detail
solutions of the two issues in Section 3.2 and 3.3 and summarize
the attack algorithm in Section 3.4.
3.2 Adversarial-Denoising Kernel Prediction
Given a deep model for image classification denoted as ϕ(·) and
a noisy image Xn, we can predict the classification label y of the
image via ϕ(Xn). Our attack method is to generate an adversarial-
noiseless example, i.e., Xa, which can let the deep model predict an
incorrect label.
First, to denoise the noisy image, we propose to estimate the
denoise kernel, i.e., Kn = {knp }, through recent kernel-prediction-
based denoising method [25]. It takes noisy images as input and
trains a pretrained CNN to predict spatially varying denoise kernels
that can remove a wide range of noise.
Second, to realize effective attack, we build the following objec-
tive function and optimize it to get the required adversarial kernels,
i.e., Ka = {kap }, as well as the weight mapM = {Mp }:
argmax
M,Ka
λJ1(ϕ({g(Xnp ,Mp , kap , knp )}),y) − (1 − λ)J2(Ka,Kn)
subject to ∀p, ∥kap ∥0 ≤ ϵ, (3)
where J1(·) denotes the crossing entropy loss for the objective of
generating adversarial kernels, i.e., fooling the deep model ϕ(·), and
J2(·) is the L2 norm loss that encourages the adversarial kernels
{kap } similar to the denoise kernels {knp } to produce a high quality
image. The hyper-parameter λ controls the balance between two
loss functions. The ‘{·}’ means the set of pixel-depended variables.
For example, {g(Xnp ,Mp , kap , knp )} is the set ofXa’s pixels. Each pixel
of Xn has an adversarial kernel, e.g., kap , and a weight, e.g.,Mp .
The constrain term, i.e., ∥kap ∥0 ≤ ϵ , requires the size of kap should
not be larger than ϵ . An oversize kernel lets the attack success easily
but heavily corrupts the original noisy image with worse quality.
We can calculate the gradient of the objective functions with
respect to both adversarial kernels and the weight map, thus realize
the gradient-based whitebox attack. We will show that such attack
can also get high success rate under blackbox attacks. However, it
should be note the weight map is only tuned by the objective of
maximising the loss function, which helps achieve high success
rate but harms the effectiveness of denoising. A desired strategy
is to only attack semantic-related regions while denoising other
regions to guarantee the image quality could be improved.
3.3 Perceptual Region Localization
As introduced in Sec. 3.1, the weight mapM should be sparse and
perceptual to realize effective adversarial-denoise attack. However,
tuning the weight mapM = {Mp } by solving Eq. 3 directly cannot
achieve these goals. In this section, we propose a perceptual region
locator to produce sparse and perceptualM.
We first use a state-of-the-art perceptual edge detector, i.e., bi-
directional cascade network [13], to extract multi-scale edge maps
of the input noisy image, i.e., {Ei }Ni=1 = φ(Xn) where φ(·) is the
bi-directional cascade network and {Ei }Ni=1 denote edge detection
results of N scales. Then, we get M = {Mp } by combining these
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Figure 2: Pipeline of our Pasadena for adversarial denoise attack. First, we propose the adversarial-denoising kernel prediction where the adversarial kernels are
predicted by optimizing the proposed adversarial objective function and the denoise kernels are calculated by employing a pre-trained kernel prediction network
(KPN) [25]. Second, we propose the perceptual region localization where the semantic-related vulnerability regions are extracted by fusing multi-scale edge maps
estimated by pre-trained bi-directional cascade network (BDCN) [13].
edge maps via
Mp = Sigmoid
( N∑
i=1
wiEip − θ
)
(4)
where Eip and Mp are the pth pixel of Ei and M, respectively.
Sigmoid(·) is a general activation function mapping the output to
[0, 1]. θ is a threshold. The intuitive motivation behind the idea is
that the multi-scale edges are sparse (i.e., most of the pixels of each
edge map are labeled as zero, i.e., non-edge) and perceptual (i.e.,
covering the main semantic information). As a result, their linear
combination, i.e., our desired weight map, is naturally inherit these
properties. Then, we can reformulate objective function in Eq. 3 as
argmax
{wi },Ka
λJ1(ϕ({g(Xnp ,
N∑
i=1
wiEip , k
a
p , k
n
p )}),y) − (1 − λ)J2(Ka,Kn)
subject to ∀p, ∥kap ∥0 ≤ ϵ . (5)
3.4 Attack Algorithm
We summarize the whole process of our attack method in Algo-
rithm 1. Given a noisy image Xn, we first estimate the denoise
kernels via kernel-prediction network (KPN), and the multi-scale
edge maps via the bi-directional cascade network (BDCN). Then,
we obtain the adversarial-noiseless image, i.e., Xa, by optimizing
Eq. 5 with the hyper-parameters, i.e., the kernel size ϵ = 5, loss
weight λ = 0.9, step size α = 0.1, and iteration number T = 10.
Among these parameters, the loss weight plays a key role for the
balance between attack success rate and image quality and we will
discuss the influence of the loss weight in the experimental section.
Algorithm 1: Pasadena for Adversarial Denoise Attack
Input: A noisy image Xn; the pre-trained kernel-prediction
network (KPN); the pre-trained bi-directional cascadee
network (BDCN), i.e., φ(·); the attacked model ϕ(·);
hyper-parameters: ϵ = 5, λ = 0.9, the threshold
θ = 0.45, step size α = 0.1, and iteration number
T = 10.
Output: Adversarial-noiseless image, i.e., Xa.
Predict the denoise kernels Kn = kpn(Xn);
Estimate the multi-scale edge maps {Ei }Ni=1 = φ(Xn) ;
Randomly initialize the {wi } in the range [0,1] and ∑i wi = 1;
Initialize the Ka = Kn;
Obtain the ground truth label by y = ϕ(Xn);
for t = 1 to T do
Calculate the gradient of the objective functions in Eq. 5
w.r.t. {wti } and Ka,t and get {∇wti } {∇ka,tp };
Update {wi } and Ka by {wt+1i = wti + α∇wti } and
{ka,t+1p = ka,tp + α∇ka,tp } ;
Calculate the perceptual weight map by
{Mt+1p = Sigmoid
(∑N
i=1w
t+1
i E
i
p − θ
)
};
Calculate the adversarial-noiseless image by
{Xap = g(Xnp ,Mt+1p , ka,t+1p , knp )};
if ϕ(Xa) , y then
return Xa ;
t = t + 1;
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4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we illustrate our experimental results to demonstrate
the capability of our framework in adversarial attacking while
increasing the image quality. We first describe the experimental
settings in Sec. 4.1. Afterwards, we compare the results of our
framework with six baseline methods applying on noisy images in
Sec. 4.2. Then, we also compare ourmethodwith a naive solution for
joint denoising and attack, which generates another six baselines,
in Sec. 4.3. At last, we perform the ablation study to evaluate the
contribution of each component in Sec. 4.4.
4.1 Setup
Dataset andModels:We conduct our experiments on an ImageNet-
compatible adversarial testing dataset [21]. This dataset was used
in NIPS2017 adversarial competition and many recent adversarial
works [7]. Specific to our task, we manually add Gaussian white
noise (σ = 0.1) to the clean images to test the image quality increas-
ing as well as the attack success of the adversarial attack methods.
To verify our performance in various networks, we introduce three
normally trained models, including Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [39], In-
ception v4 (Inc-v4) and Inception ResNet v2 (IncRes-v2) [38].
Metrics. To evaluate the effectiveness of the adversarial denoise
attack, which fools classifier and denoises image at the same time,
we select the attack success rate and image quality for measuring
the performance of attack methods. There are two widely used full-
reference image quality assessment metrics: peak signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity (SSIM) [45]:
PSNR(X ,Y ) = 20 · log10
(
MAXI
MSE
)
(6)
SSIM(X ,Y ) = (2µx µy + c1)(2σxy + c2)(µ2x + µ2y + c1)(σ 2x + σ 2y + c2)
, (7)
whereX and Y are two images. µx and µy are mean values ofX and
Y . σ 2x and σ 2y are variances of them. σxy is their covariance.MAXI is
the max value of intensity, which is 255 under 8-bit representation.
Due to that PSNR evaluates image via error sensitivity, it ignores
the local structure information and results in a anti-subjective feel-
ing. Thus, we propose a variant of PSNRwhich is denoted as PSNRL .
It measures the global signal difference and the local similarity at
meantime with the help of a sliding windowW . Given two images
X,Y, their PSNRL is formulated as:
PSNRL(X ,Y ) =
1
S
S∑
i=1
PSNR(W Xi ,W Yi ), (8)
where,W Xi andW
Y
i are image patches ofX andY on the ith sliding
window. S is the number of sliding windows. During the imple-
mentation, the sliding windows have a size of 8 and stride of 1.
Besides, we also choose a no-reference image quality assessment
metric, dubbed blind/referenceless image spatial quality evaluator
(BRISQUE) [26], to further evaluate the quality of attack output.
This metric utilizes scene statistics of locally normalized luminances
coefficients, named mean subtracted contrast normalized (MSCN),
to quantify possible losses of ‘naturalness’ in the image. Given an
image X, the MSCN coefficient on pixel X (i, j) is formulated as:
MSCN(i, j) = X (i, j) − µ(i, j)
σ (i, j) +C , (9)
where, i ∈ 1, 2...M, j ∈ 1, 2...N are indices, M, N are image height
and width. C = 1 is a stability keeping constant parameter when
the denominator tends to zero. µ(i, j) and σ (i, j) are local weighted
mean and local weighted standard deviation, respectively. Noted
that, different with PSNRL or SSIM, the lower BRISQUE value refers
to better image quality. Finally, we select the attack success rate,
PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE for measuring the general performance
of attack methods in our task.
Attack Baselines.We select six adversarial attack methods as
the baselines: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [9], momentum
iterative fast gradient sign method (MIFGSM) [6], diverse inputs
method (DIM) [46], as well as their translation-invariant version
proposed in [7] which are denoted as TIFGSM, TIMIFGSM, and
TIDIM, respectively. In particular, we set the Gaussian kernel (ker-
nel size = 15 and σ = 3) following Dong’s report [7].
Denoise & Attack Baselines. We also compare our method
with a naive solution for joint denoising and attack, i.e., first denois-
ing the noisy inputs and then attacking the denoised images. As a re-
sult, we obtain another six baselines (i.e., ‘Denoise+FGSM/MIFGSM/
DIM/TIFGSM/TIMIFGSM/TIDIM’) with the six attacks and a state-
of-the-art denoising method, i.e., KPN [25].
4.2 Comparison with Attack Baselines
4.2.1 Quantitative Analysis. We first demonstrate the denoising
and attack ability of our framework in this part by evaluating the
performance of adversarial examples crafted for Inc-v4 model. To
evaluate the effect of our hyper-parameters, we choose four differ-
ent adversarial weights λ in Eq. 3 (λ = 0.9, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1). The curves
are generated by sliding threshold θ in Eq. 4 from 0.05 to 0.65. We
also attack Inception-v4 model with six baseline adversarial meth-
ods. The maximum perturbation ϵ ranges from 4 to 55with the max
intensity of 255.
Fig. 4 illustrates the whitebox attacks against to Inc-v4 model.
It seems that the baselines can keep their image quality with a
small perturbation (See the rightmost two points of baselines.).
However, this phenomenon is not an evidence of their image quality
keeping ability. Because of the original noise of inputs, their image
quality doesn’t decrease before adversarial noise level exceed the
original noise level. But, when baseline methods attack images with
ϵ over 8, the increase of ϵ then results in a rapid decrease on SSIM
and PSNRL (increase on BRISQUE), showing their negative effect
against to image quality. On the other hand, our attack results have
better image qualities comparing with all baselines. Even the point
with highest success rate, which means a maximum perturbation
strength, still have a higher SSIM or PSNRL value (lower BRISQUE
value). It demonstrates that our framework can achieve a similar
attack ability with baselines, while having the potential to increase
the image quality as well.
The curves of our methods with different weight settings show
that lower threshold for edge detector refers to lager attack size
in image, and thereby generates stronger attack. In addition, the
adversarial loss weight determines the upper bound of attack ability.
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Figure 3: Visualization results of adversarial examples crafted for Inception-v4, using ourmethod Pasadena and six baseline attacks. For each image, its prediction
of Inception-v4 is displayed on top-left. Three numbers at the bottom refer to PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE values. All noisy inputs are correctly classified to their
ground truth label.
Table 1: Adversarial comparison results on NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset with Additive Gaussian Noise (σ=0.1). It contains the success rates(%) of
black&whitebox adversarial attacks among three normally trained models-Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, using six baseline methods with ϵ = 8 and our Pasadena.
For each three columns, whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The rest two columns display the blackbox attack results. We highlight the top three
results with red, yellow and green, respectively.
Crafted from Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
Attacked model Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Inc-v3 Inc-v3 IncRes-v2 Inc-v4 Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
FGSM 33.0 34.2 89.5 38.0 40.2 85.2 39.8 37.9 81.2
TIFGSM 26.6 22.4 83.1 23.7 25.8 77.7 25.9 28.5 73.4
MIFGSM 18.2 19.8 93.2 32.4 32.1 94.0 41.7 36.7 96.8
TIMIFGSM 23.0 20.3 92.9 24.7 27.0 92.8 30.6 35.3 93.8
DIM 48.3 49.2 94.3 56.6 57.7 94.1 63.1 60.4 95.1
TIDIM 39.8 35.0 91.7 35.4 40.2 90.8 40.6 47.1 89.6
Pasadena (ours) 64.0 62.8 88.2 66.6 66.9 93.9 69.8 73.4 92.1
Noted that some of TI attacking outputs have better BRISQUE
values than noise inputs. The reason is that BRISQUE evaluates im-
age according to its possible losses of “naturalness” by generalized
Gaussian distribution. Other type of distortions would counteract
“noise”. TI attacking method smooths the basic adversarial noise to
enhance its transferability. This operation yields a better BRISQUE
score for the noise input.
4.2.2 Qualitative Analysis. Fig. 3 illustrates some adversarial ex-
amples of baselines and our framework. Our approach focuses on
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Figure 4: Whitebox attack success rate along with PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE for six baseline methods with noise inputs and our four results (Pasadena) with
different adversarial lossweights λ. Our curves are generatedwith thresholdθ ranging from 0.05 to 0.65. From right to left, the points on baseline are corresponding
to ϵ = 0, 4, 8, 16, 28, 42, 55.
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Figure 5: Visualization results of adversarial examples crafted for Inception-v4, using our method Pasadena and six baseline attacks. Different with Fig. 3, there
is a denoising procedure (KPN) before baseline attacks. For each image, its prediction of Inception-v4 is displayed on top-left. Three numbers at the bottom refer
to PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE values. All noisy inputs are correctly classified to their ground truth label.
conducting the attack against to the edge area, which is more vul-
nerable than other part. This operation makes our method achieve
the maximum attack with minimum perturbation. For example, the
TIMIFGSM attacks the first image of panda by perturbing every part
and successfully misleads the prediction result as Pomeranian but
poses a terrible image quality. However, during our attack changes
ACM Multimedia ’20, October 12–16, 2020, Seattle, WA Trovato and Tobin, et al.
Table 2: Adversarial comparison results on NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset with Additive Gaussian Noise (σ=0.1). It contains the success rates(%) of
black&whitebox adversarial attacks among three normally trained models-Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, using six baseline methods with ϵ = 8 (denoised before
attacked) and our Pasadena. For each three columns, whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The rest two columns display the blackbox attack results.
We highlight the top three results with red, yellow and green, respectively.
Crafted from Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
Attacked model Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Inc-v3 Inc-v3 IncRes-v2 Inc-v4 Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
Denoise+FGSM 9.1 12.1 77.6 10.9 14.2 67.2 11.9 11.2 62.2
Denoise+TIFGSM 4.4 4.0 60.2 0 4.7 45.1 0.2 8.9 46.1
Denoise+MIFGSM 12.3 14.1 97.3 19.0 21.8 98.3 29.9 25.5 100.0
Denoise+TIMIFGSM 8.9 6.1 96.6 6.3 11.0 97.4 13.3 23.6 96.4
Denoise+DIM 36.2 36.7 97.3 43.0 42.1 97.9 51.4 48.4 98.0
Denoise+TIDIM 24.4 16.4 93.4 16.6 21.2 94.2 21.6 34.5 91.1
Pasadena (ours) 64.0 62.8 88.2 66.6 66.9 93.9 69.8 73.4 92.1
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Figure 6: Whitebox attack success rate along with PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE for six baseline methods with DENOISED inputs and our four results (Pasadena)
with different adversarial loss weights λ. Our curves are generated with threshold θ ranging from 0.05 to 0.65. From right to left, the points on baseline are
corresponding to ϵ = 0, 16, 28, 42, 55.
prediction result to bobtail, it carries out another strategy which
modifies the junction of its face and body in image. Moreover, it
even depresses, rather than adds, noise on the non-edge part, and
thereby resulting in a good image quality. Similar operation is also
shown on the second image. Our method attacks only the edge of
clothes and faces while baseline methods pollute all of the image
and make the noise image noisier. For the image with obvious fore-
ground object and contains rare edge, such as the fourth noisy input,
our method produces excellent denoising result (PSNRL = 31.25,
SSIM= 0.718) with a success attack. However, the input with many
edges or high frequency information may heavily depresses the
performance of our edge detection method (See images in the third,
fifth and last row). Our method thereby generates an indiscrim-
inately attack for the entire image and results in low PSNRL an
SSIM values. But we still achieve an improvement in image quality
comparing with other attack methods.
4.2.3 Comparison on Transferability. To verify the transferability
of our method, we conduct black-box attack experiment under the
same image quality. For a fair comparison, we pick ϵ = 8 for all
baseline methods for their similar image quality.
Table 1 shows the blackbox andwhitebox attacks results between
three normally trained models. The first row shows the model
from which we conduct the whitebox attack. Then we apply the
whitebox attack results to other two blackbox models. The results
show that our method achieves the highest transferability because
our method conducts the attack on the vulnerable part in image,
i.e., the edge that is the common vulnerable area for most models.
Nevertheless, adversarial noise on non-edge area may fail when it
comes to different models.
4.3 Comparison with Denoise & Attack
Baselines
4.3.1 Quantitative Analysis. We compare our method with de-
noise & attack baselines and show the results in Fig. 6. In terms of
PSNRL and SSIM, our Pasadena with λ = 0.9 has higher PSNRL and
SSIM than Denoise+FGSM and Denoise+TIFGSM under the simi-
lar success rates, but has slightly lower quality scores than other
four baseline methods. However, when considering the BRISQUE
measuring the naturalness of images, our method beats all six de-
noise & attack methods, which demonstrates the our method can
generate more natural adversarial images.
4.3.2 Qualitative Analysis. We show six adversarial attack images
in Fig. 5 with our Pasadena and six denoise & attack methods.
Comparing with six baselines, our method can generate much better
visualization results. For example, the ‘Panda’ case in the first row
shows that our method maintains the denoising effect for no-edge
regions (e.g., the face and body of panda), and only implements
attack on the edge regions (e.g., the boundary across the black and
white regions), leading to successful attack (e.g., classification result
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Table 3: Varying denoising method and edge detector in our framework to conduct attacks among three normally trained models-Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2. For
each three columns, whitebox attack results are shown in the last one. The rest two columns display the blackbox attack results. We highlight the results with
different red intensities according to their success rates.
Crafted from Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
Attacked model Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Inc-v3 Inc-v3 IncRes-v2 Inc-v4 Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2
Pasadena(Gau,Canny) 45.6 40.0 79.0 52.5 48.0 82.7 56.9 54.9 83.9
Pasadena(KPN,Canny) 55.9 53.9 82.9 62.5 60.6 90.4 64.1 62.6 88.4
Pasadena(Gau,BDCN) 57.3 54.6 85.1 62.9 61.0 92.2 66.4 67.4 89.9
Pasadena(KPN,BDCN) 64.0 62.8 88.2 66.6 66.9 93.9 69.8 73.4 92.1
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Figure 7: Whitebox attack success rate along with PSNRL , SSIM and BRISQUE for our framework with different choice of denoising and edge detector methods.
KPN refers to the denoising method proposed in [25]. Gau means Gaussian kernel is selected in our denoising part. Canny and BDCN are edge detecting methods
of [3] and [13], respectively. The dots with zero success rate represent the performance of denoising results using KPN (blue and yellow) and Gaussian kernel
(green and purple).
from ‘Panda’ to ‘Bobtail’) while better visualization (i.e., higher
PSNRL , SSIM, and lower BRISQUE).
In contrast, the denoise & attack methods perturb the entire de-
noised image and result in re-corrupted images with obvious noise
textures, although they might achieve higher PSNRL and SSIM than
our method. Specifically, the Denoise+TIFGSM/TIMIFGSM/TIDIM
methods produce salient noise texture on all images, although they
have similar PSNRL and SSIM with our method. Moreover, some
of the baselines fail to mislead the input images. For example, De-
noise+FGSM/TIFGSM do not change the predicted category of the
input ‘basketball player’ image.
4.3.3 Comparison on Transferability. To further verify the trans-
ferability of our methods, we conduct a transferability experiment
with the same setting of Sec. 4.2.3 and show the whitebox attacking
results as well as their corresponding transferability across three
normally trained models in Table 2. It is easy to see that our method
achieves the highest transferability for all subject models, i.e., Inc-
v3, Inc-v4, and IncRes-v2. Specifically, in terms of the subject model
Inc-v3, i.e., adversarial attacking results crafted from Inception-v3,
TIMIFGSM has the highest whitebox attacking success rate of 94.3%,
while our method has slighly worse result with 88.2%. However,
when considering the transferability of Denoise+TIMIFGSM, i.e.,
the success rate of using adversarial examples to attack Inc-v4 and
IncRes-v2, its success rates i.e., 48.3% and 49.2%, are much lower
than that of our method, i.e., 66.6% and 66.9%. We find similar ad-
versarial results crafted for other two models, which draws the the
same conclusion with Sec. 4.2.3, i.e., our adversarial attacking results
have the highest transferability over all baselines.
4.4 Ablation Study
In this section, we exhibit the results of our framework with differ-
ent choice of denoising and edge detector methods. To be specific,
we choose two methods for each part in our framework, i.e., KPN
[25] and Gaussian kernel for denoising part, Canny operator [3]
and BDCN [13] for edge detecting part. As Canny operator gener-
ates edge map with 1−pixel width, we apply a dilation operation
before feeding it into our framework. During the implementation,
we choose four dilation sizes, denoted as canny width CannyW ,
uniformly ranging from 3 to 9. We also choose four thresholds θ
for BDCN methods, i.e., 0.05, 0.25, 0.45, 0.65.
4.4.1 Quantitative Analysis. Fig. 7 illustrates the performance of
our frameworkwith different denoisingmethods and edge detectors.
KPN (blue and yellow curves) exhibits a better ability in keeping
image quality than Gaussian kernel (green and purple curves). Blue-
green lines pair and yellow-purple lines pair both illustrate that
higher image quality is inherited from better denoising results. Note
that there are three points of purple, green and blue which have
a similar attack success rate of 0.8 with giant difference in terms
of image quality. Among these points, purple group (Gaussian and
Canny) holds the worst SSIM and PSNRL values around 0.4 and
20. Comparing with Gaussian and BDCN group (green), BDCN
outperforms Canny to a great extend. The blue point of group KPN
and BDCN is the best in image quality, which further confirms the
positive effect of KPN.
4.4.2 Qualitative Analysis. Fig. 8 lists three groups of adversarial
examples using different combination of denoising methods and
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Figure 8: Visualization results of adversarial examples crafted for Inception-
v4, using our method Pasadena with different denoising methods and edge
detectors. The denoising methods are KPN [25] and Gaussian kernel (kernel
size=5, σ = 1), while edge detectors are BDCN and Canny. Combining form
is list at top of each group. For each image, its prediction of Inception-v4 is
displayed on top-left. Three numbers at the bottom refer to PSNRL , SSIM and
BRISQUE values.
edge detectors. The combination of KPN and BDCN successfully
attack the inputs as well as keeping the best image quality, The leaf
and desk are more clear in two KPN groups. Same situation also oc-
curs in the wall of the second case, and the cloth of the third case. In
addition, comparing the attack area of the third input, (Gau, Canny)
pollutes the face of rightmost person. But (Gau, BDCN) denoises
most area of face and only perturbs the edge. That means BDCN
can precisely locate vulnerable area while keeping the denoising
effect for the no-edge part.
4.4.3 Comparison on transferability. To further study the influ-
ence of each part to the transferability, we use a similar hyper-
parameters selection strategy as the former experiment in Sec 4.2.3.
CannyW = 3 and θ = 0.05 are thereby picked for they share the
similar SSIM values near 0.4 in Fig 7. Table 3 shows the results
which draw the same conclusion with Sec. 4.4. Combination of KPN
and BDCN outperforms other groups in both whitebox attacks and
blackbox attacks, which further proves that better denoising and
edge detecting results enhance our final performance. Specifically,
our framework benefits from excellent denoising ability of KPN
and generate more powerful adversarial examples in high image
qualities. However, Gaussian kernel losing its denoising ability too
early before our framework reaches higher attack success rate. In
addition, BDCN helps our framework focus its attack on vulnerable
area by its precise edge locating ability. While Canny edge gener-
ates too much non-effective attacking area which sacrifices image
quality without any increase on attack success rate.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have investigated a new task named as adversarial
denoise attack that stealthily embeds the attacks inside the image
denoising module. Thus it can simultaneously denoise input images
while fooling the state-of-the-art deep models. We have formulated
this new task as a kernel prediction problem and proposed the
adversarial-denoising kernel prediction that can produce adversarial-
noiseless kernels for effective denoising and adversarial attacking
simultaneously. Furthermore, we have implemented an adaptive
perceptual region localization to identify the semantic-related vul-
nerability regions with which the attack can be more effective while
not doing too much harm to the denoising. Thus, our proposed
method is termed as Pasadena (Perceptually Aware and Stealthy
Adversarial DENoise Attack). We have validated our method on the
NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset and demonstrated that
our method not only realizes denoising but has advantages of high
success rate and transferability over the state-of-the-art attacks. In
future, it is interested to explore the interplay between Pasadena
and other novel additive and non-additive adversarial attack modes
[10, 11, 42] as well as in tandem with the potential improvement on
the attack and defense mechanisms [19, 20, 32, 43, 44] surrounding
the imminent DeepFake problems.
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